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Following the first widespread dissemination of Marx' s 
early writings, his treatment of human needs was often 
taken as the basis for a critique of the 'false needs' created 
by capitalism and its consumer culture. 1 'True needs' for 
meaningful social interaction were counterposed to the 
'false needs' for ever more consumer goods.2 Along with 
this went a tendency to construe the very idea of natural 
needs, needs given by our physiological nature, as an 
artifact of capitalist social relations.3 
As the post-war boom has given way to a succession of 
major recessions in the advanced capitalist countries over 
the last twenty years, and the absolute impoverishment of 
parts of the Third World, the critique of consumerism has 
come to look increasingl y irrelevant. Correspondingly more 
recent work on Marx' s conception of human needs has 
tended to emphasise their basis in our natural physiology. 
This enables the degree to which they are satisfied to 
provide a simple but solid standard against which to con-
demn capitalism for its periodic reduction of masses of the 
world's population to poverty.4 Ted Benton (1988) has re-
cently attempted to use such a 'naturalistic' conception of 
human needs, in which the distance between human and 
animal needs is reduced and animals' needs are also given 
normative weight, to argue for an ecological content to 
Marx's thought. 5 
Both lines of interpretation, then, look to Marx for a 
conception of our 'true needs' , although in the one case the 
implicit model of human need is something like the need for 
friendship, while in the other it is more like the need for 
cooked food. In this paper I will argue that Marx does have 
a concept oftruly human needs. I will side with the first line 
of interpretation and against the second in seeing these 
needs as qualitatively distinct both from animal needs, and 
from needs as they are experienced by humans under 
capitalism. However, by contrast with the first line, I shall 
argue that Marx does not see the needs experienced by 
humans under capitalism as 'perverted' or 'distorted' ver-
sions of truly human needs. Rather, capitalism, or at least 
commodity production, is the means whereby truly human 
needs are constituted, albeit in an estranged form which can 
only be overcome through the abolition of both capitalism 
and commodity production. 
Marx 's concept of need has to be understood in the 
context of his philosophical anthropology, that is, his general 
theory of man.6 As a first approximation, for Marx man's 
essence is constituted by his needs. So he says in the Notes 
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on lames Mill (1844) that: ' ... the need for a thing is the most 
obvious, irrefutable proof that that thing is part of my 
essence' (NJM 267, MEW 452).7 
It was in the Notes on lames Mill (1844), the Economic 
and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844) and The German 
Ideology (with Engels, 1845-6), that Marx worked out his 
philosophical anthropology. 8 Hence this paper will con-
centrate on the role that needs play in the anthropology of 
these texts. This leaves open the question of whether in his 
mature economic works Marx operated with substantially 
the same anthropology and the same concept of need. In fact 
I believe that he did, but at all events it seems safe to say that 
an understanding of the anthropology of the 1840s cannot 
fail to throw light on his concept of need in his later 
economic work. 
Marx's way of developing his philosophical anthropology 
is first of all to derive the most essential characteristics of 
man, or the human being, by contrasting man to the animals. 
Then he tries to show that in man as we know him these 
characteristics are only realised in a self-stultifying way. 
This enables him in turn to contrast man as we know him 
with man as he could be, if those characteristics were 
realised properly. As a result, he can portray man's present 
condition as 'inhuman' without resorting to an entirely 
arbitrary conception of what counts as human. 
Human activity as species activity 
What then distinguishes man from the animals? Marx' s 
most fundamental answer is his universality. In the termi-
nology of the 1844 Manuscripts, man is Gattungswesen, that 
is, a 'species-being'. Gattung means species, but also type 
or kind, so we could equally translate Gattungswesen as a 
'type-being' ora 'kind-being'.9Wesenmeans 'essence', but 
also 'a being' (as opposed to the generic term 'being' 
meaning 'existence'). From now on I shall translate it as 
'essence' for consistency, but we have to remember that for 
Marx it means not only an essence but also a being, a 
creature who has an essence. 
Marx expounds the idea of man as a species-essence 
with a threefold definition: 
Man is a species-essence, not only because (1) he 
practicall y and theoretic all y makes the kind [Gattung] 
- both his own and those of other things - his object, 
but also - and this is simply another way of saying the 
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same thing - because (2) he relates to himselfIO as the 
present [gegenwartigen], living species, because (3) 
he relates to himself as a universal and therefore free 
essence. (EPM 327, MEW 515). 
I shall concentrate on the practical rather than the theoretical 
side of this preliminary definition, that is, on what Marx 
elsewhere calls species-activity, or kind-activity. I I Species-
activity means the activity characteristic of a species-es-
senceY I shall take the three parts of the definition of 
species-activity in the following order, different from Marx' s, 
so as to show how they are connected to one another: (1) he 
relates to himself as the species, (2) he relates to himself as 
a free essence, as a free being, (3) he makes the kind his 
object. 
(1) Species-activity is first of all 'relating to oneself as 
the species', that is, I take it, participating in the life of the 
species as a whole by producing something for other human 
beings and in turn enjoying what others have produced for 
you: 
The interchangeD both of human activities in the 
course of production and of human products with each 
other is equal to the species-activity and the species-
spirit whose real, conscious and true existence con-
sists in social activity and social enjoyment. (NJM 
265, MEW 450-51) 
(2) So, for Marx, 'human' and 'social' are virtually 
equivalent terms. But mutual production and consumption 
are not all that he means by species-activity, otherwise it 
could be said that ants engage in species-activity, or that 
ants have a society, and Marx would deny this. What is 
unique about human species-activity, for Marx, seems to be 
that the activities of production are directed, that is, men not 
only act on nature, but they act on their own actions. 
The animal is immediately one with its life-activity. 
It does not distinguish itself from it; it is that activity. 
Man makes his life-activity itself into an object of his 
willing and consciousness. He has conscious life-
activity. It is not a determination with which he 
immediately merges. Conscious life-activity distin-
guishes man immediately from animal life-activity . 
Only because of that is he a species-essence .... Only 
because ofthat is his activity free activity. (EPM 328, 
MEW 516)14 
So species-activity is firstly the activity of producing things 
for other human beings and enjoying the products of other 
human beings, and secondly it is activity which is consciously 
directed, and thus free. Marx never really clarifies the link 
between these two aspects of the idea of species activity, but 
it seems to be that, in the case of humans , as opposed to ants, 
individuals are not assigned by their own nature to anyone 
particular productive activity. Therefore on the one hand 
they must be capable of a whole range of alternative 
productive activities, yet on the other they must have some 
say of singling out one of those activities as the one to 
engage in, at anyone time, in order to coordinate with other 
individuals. The way they do this is by language, and 
language brings in its train consciousness and the conscious 
24 
direction of activities. Here is how Marx and Engels sketch 
the connection in The German Ideology: 
Language is as old as consciousness, language is 
practical, real, consciousness that exists for other 
men as well, and only therefore does it also exist for 
me; language, like consciousness, first arises from 
the need, the necessity [N otdUlft] , of intercourse with 
other men. (CW5 44, MEW2 30) 
(3) Now consciously directed activity can be called 
universal in the sense that once human beings are capable of 
redirecting their activity they can in principle redirect it 
over and over again. But it also involves a universality 
within each of those activities. The conscious direction of 
activities has to be their direction in accord with general or 
'universal' concepts. So it must be activity which has 
general concepts, as it were 'built into it'. Specifically, this 
must mean that when human beings act on things they do not 
act on them as unique particulars, but as examples of the 
kinds (or species) to which those things belong. Their action 
on a thing is 'mediated' through the general concept of 
which they are treating the thing as an instance. I suggest 
that this is what Marx means by the third aspect of his 
definition of species-activity, the idea that it is activity 
which makes the species, or kind, its object. If I burn a log 
for warmth I am treating it as an instance of firewood. My 
action on the log is mediated through the concept of 
'firewood', and the object of my activity is the log as a piece 
of firewood. If instead I sit on it I am treating it as 'a stool' . 
If I throw it away I am treating it as 'rubbish', and so on. In 
this sense species-activity is activity which takes 'universal 
objects'.15 
To summarise, the unifying characteristiC of species-
activity is what can loosely be called its 'universal' quality. 
This quality recurs in each of the three parts of the defini-
tion. Species-activity is universal (1) in that it is social, (2) 
in that it is consciously directed and so free, and (3) in that 
it is mediated by general concepts. 
Human property as essential objects 
For Marx, the essence of man consists in the first instance 
in his characteristic activity, namely species-activity. From 
this starting point, it is possible to see how the essence of 
man could also consist in his characteristic needs. An ac-
tivity is defined partly by its objects, by what it is activity on: 
the objects which it uses, consumes, or produces. It is also 
defined by its motivation, by what it is activity for. So, just 
as we can talk of the' essential activities' of a being, those 
activities which are definitive of its essence, we also can talk 
of its 'essential objects' (the objects of those activities) and 
also of its 'essential motivations' (the motivating sources of 
those activities). I think it is this idea of essential human 
motivations that Marx tried to convey with the term 'needs'. 16 
Need, essential activity and essential object, in other 
words, must be understood to form a single complex for 
Marx. Need is the subjective component of activity, just as 
the object is its objective component. This suggests that, 
just as human activity is distinguished from animal activity 
by its universality, and its objects by their universality, so 
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human needs should be distinguished from animal needs by 
their universality. 
To see what the idea of universal needs involves, we 
have to say something more about what Marx means by 
man's essential objects, the objects of species-activity. I 
said that an activity treats a thing as a 'universal object' in 
that it treats it as an example of a kind, as when I use a log 
as a stool. Here the universality is purely 'intentional': a 
matter of what I treat the thing as, or use it for. Character-
istically, though, human beings impose this universality on 
the physical structure of the things which are the objects of 
their activity. For example, we construct a chair. Now the 
universality which we 'impose' on the log by sitting on it 
has been built into the chair. A chair embodies in its structure 
a certain class of individual actions which count as 'using 
this thing as a chair', in that it is designed to facilitate that 
class of actions. It is the physical analogue of a concept. 17 
Furthermore, this built-in universality is a general char-
acteristic of the things which human beings produce for 
each other. The structure of a chair means that in principle 
any human being, any being capable of making the kind its 
object, can use it. 
So man's essential objects are universal both in the sense 
that they embody the universality of a class of standard 'use 
actions' in their physical structure, and in the sense that they 
can be used in principle by any human being. 
Now according to Marx through working on nature to 
create a world of such universal objects, through, as it were 
'humanising nature', man progressively 'objectifies' his 
inherent universality, that is, 'objectifies' himself as a 
species-essence: 
It is therefore in his working-up of the objective 
world that man really proves himself to be a species-
essence. This production is his active species-life. 
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Through it nature appears as his work and his reality. 
The object oflabour is therefore the objectification of 
the species-life of man: for man doubles [verdoppelt] 
himself not only intellectually, in his consciousness, 
but actively and actually, and therefore looks at 
himself in a world he has created. (EPM 329, MEW 
517)18 
Such objects are what Marx calls 'human property', 
'true property', or 'inner property', terms which have a 
positive not a negative meaning for him. Human property is 
the objectification of our species-essence in the physical 
world. It is the objects used, produced, and consumed by 
species-activity. It is, as he puts it: ' ... the existence 
[Dasein] of essential objects for man, both as objects of 
enjoyment and of activity' (EPM 375, MEW 563). 
Thus human property comprises the products of human 
species-activity which can fulfil human needs. Human 
property and human needs are correlative terms, and both 
are equally definitive of the human essence. This is made 
clearest in the passage from which I quoted at the start, 
which contrasts this 'inner property' with ordinary private 
property. It describes two private property owners each of 
whom experiences a need for the other's object: 
The longing for each of these objects, i.e. the need 
for them, shows each private-property-owner 
[Privateigentiimer], makes him conscious, that he 
has another essential relation to the objects apart 
from that of private property, that he is not the 
particular essence which he takes himself to be but a 
total essence, whose needs stand in a relation of inner 
property to all products, including those of another's 
labour. For the need for a thing is the most obvious, 
irrefutable proof that thing is part of my essence, that 
its being is for me and that its property [Eigentum] is 
my property, the peculiarity [Eigentiimlichkeit] of my 
essence. (NJM 267, MEW 452)19 
Human needs as essential motivations 
Their connection with human property gives us a first 
handle on what Marx means by human needs. If we now 
look at what Marx has to say about them directly, we can see 
him again concentrating on the characteristic of universality. 
Sometimes Marx expresses this by contrasting the mobility 
of human needs with the physical, immediate, or fixed 
quality of animal needs: 
It is true that animals also produce. They build nests 
and dwellings, like the bee, the beaver, the ant etc. 
But they produce only what they or their young 
immediately need [bedarj]; they produce one-sidedly, 
while man produces universally; they produce only 
under the domination of immediate physical need, 
while man produces even when he is free from 
physical need and only truly produces in freedom 
from such need. (EPM 329, MEW 517) 
In so far as man is characteristically human, his activity is 
motivated by needs which are not simply given by his 
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physical constitution. They are not 'immediate'. Instead 
they are mediated by species-activity itself and the world of 
objects it produces. In the course of history, the social 
interchange of productive activities and products becomes 
more complex, and human needs develop along with the 
new objects which are produced. Marx calls this the 'edu-
cation of the senses': 
Not only the five senses, but also the so-called 
spiritual senses, the practical senses (will, love, etc.), 
in a word, the human sense, the humanity of the 
senses - all these come into being only through the 
existence [Dasein] of their objects, through human-
ised nature. The education [Bildung] of the five 
senses is the work of all previous world history. Sense 
which is trapped by crude practical need has only a 
restricted sense. For a man who is starving the human 
form offood does not exist, only its abstract existence 
(Dasein) as food does. (EPM 353, MEW 541-2) 
Obviously Marx is not saying here that the mere pro-
duction of a new object gives rise to a need for it. His picture 
must be of needs, activities and objects developing in close 
interaction with each other, and it does not commit him to 
anyone of them providing the motor of development. His 
point is their interdependence. It is easy to see that the 
objects we produce depend on the needs we experience. 
Marx is arguing that the dependence goes the other way as 
well: whether we can experience a need depends on whether 
the objects that correspond to that need have become 
available to us. 20 
The result of this whole process is that needs tend to 
become refined. They become less like the hungry man's 
need for food and more like the musically cultivated person's 
need for music.21 At the same time needs tend to diversify 
and mUltiply. Mann's needs become 'many-sided' along 
with the diversification of production (NJM 268, MEW 
454), and this results in what Marx calls 'the rich man and 
rich human need' (EPM 356, MEW 544): 
Developed society produces man in all the wealth of 
his essence, the rich man who is profoundly and 
abundantly endowed with all the senses as its con-
stant reality. (EPM 354, MEW 542) 
Insofar as needs become refined on the one hand and many-
sided on the other, they become in effect needs which can 
only be satisfied by the products of other human beings, by 
the objectifications of species-activity. In this sense human 
needs are more and more needs for other human beings. 
Marx connects the idea that human needs are our needs for 
each other with a conception of human need as expressive. 
He says that: 
The rich man is simultaneously the man in-need-of 
[Bedibftige] a totality of human life-expression; he is 
the man in whom his own realisation exists as inner 
necessity, as necessity [Not]. (EMP 356, MEW 544) 
Human beings express themselves through the creation of 
universal objects, and so the need for human life-expression 
is the need to create such objects for other human beings, i.e. 
to create objects that can in principle satisfy the needs of any 
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human being, thus to satisfy other people's needs as such, 
regardless of who those people are. The individual does not 
become a universal altruist, but experiences the creation of 
a universal object, one which can in principle satisfy the 
needs of any human being, as a need in itself. An inventor 
or a scientist could serve just as much for a present-day 
example of expressive need as an artist. More generally, 
Marx suggests that a point could be reached at which all 
labour results from such an 'inner necessary must [Not]' 
(NJM 278, MEW 263).22 
For Marx, then, human needs are constitutive of our 
essence as human beings. This contrasts with a tradition of 
thought that runs from Plato and the Stoics up to Kant and 
Nietzsche in which needs were antithetical to our essence as 
free beings, and the multiplication of needs associated with 
civilisation meant only the multiplication of ways in which 
man's will was controlled and unfree. In Kant, motivation 
by needs and inclinations is heteronomy, and the free will 
determines itself in abstraction from all such motivations. 
For Marx instead the refinement and diversification of 
needs is of the essence of man. Accordingly his freedom 
consists in this elaboration. It is only social conditions that 
make us experience things otherwise. 
Marx and Engels make this clearest in a discussion of the 
categorical imperative in the German Ideology: 
The only reason why Christianity wanted to free us 
from the domination of the flesh and 'desires 
[Begierden] as a driving force' was because we 
regarded our flesh and our desires as something 
foreign to us; it wanted to free us from natural 
determination only because it regarded our own 
nature as not belonging to us. For if I myself am not 
nature, if my natural desires, my whole natural char-
acter, do not belong to myself - and this is the 
doctrine of Christianity - then all determination by 
nature - whether through my own natural-character 
[Natiirlichkeit] or through so-called external nature-
appears to me as a determination by something alien, 
a fetter, a compulsion used against me, heteronomy 
as opposed to autonomy of the spirit. (CW5 254, 
MEW2237)23 
The reason that we experience our needs and desires as an 
external imposition on us is that social conditions, 'worldly 
relations', are such as to frustrate them, to 'fix' them, as 
Marx and Engels put it (CW5 255, MEW2 237). By contrast, 
communists' strive to achieve an organisation of production 
and intercourse which will make possible the normal sat-
isfaction of all needs, i.e. a satisfaction which is limited only 
by the needs themselves' (CW5 256, MEW2 239).24 
Conditional exchange and labour 
for an income 
This brings us to the question of what it is about present 
'worldly relations' that prevents this normal satisfaction, 
and makes us experience our needs as external to our 
essence and opposed to our freedom. In fact everything I 
have said so far on species-activity, human property and 
human needs is only half of the story for Marx, to the point 
that I have been forced to draw partly on his descriptions of 
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a future socialist society in order to elaborate it. The central 
point he attempts to make in the 1844 Manuscripts is that all 
these three aspects of the human essence have come into 
existence in a way which is self-contradictory, in an 'es-
tranged' or' alienated' way. This is because they have come 
into existence through what Marx calls' exchange' (Tausch) 
or 'barter' (Tauschhandel). The point about 'exchange', as 
opposed to the general concept of' interchange' (Austausch), 
which I used in introducing species-activity, is that it is 
conditional. It is the exchange of products between two 
parties in which each gives his product to the other only on 
condition that the other does likewise. 25 
Conditional exchange is the way that species-activity 
comes into existence, principally because it allows the 
interchange of products to take place outside the narrow 
range ofthe family or the primitive tribal community. What 
you can exchange with one person, you can in principle 
exchange with anyone else, so that exchange can ultimately 
establish an interchange of products between the whole of 
the human race. But just this capability of establishing an 
interchange with strangers while continuing to treat them as 
strangers, as alien, is what makes conditional exchange, and 
the form of species-activity it introduces, self-contradic-
tory. 
Marx expresses this by describing a transition from an 
apparently solitary 'man for himself - in a stage of savage 
barbarism' (NJM 274, MEW 459), producing purely for his 
own needs, to man producing for conditional exchange. 26 
When he produces for his own needs his labour is not 
species-activity any more than that of a beaver is. No 
universality is involved. The object produced by his labour 
is at the same time the object which he uses. When he begins 
to produce for exchange, his activity becomes, potentially 
at least, species-activity. But although it is species-activity 
in that it is the production of objects which will satisfy the 
needs of other human beings, this is not the producer's 
primary pUlpose in engaging in it. His primary purpose is 
still to satisfy his own needs, only now indirectly through 
exchanging his products for the products of other people. If 
he adopts the purpose of producing objects which will 
satisfy their needs, this is only a derivative purpose, an aim 
which he adopts because he must attain it in order to attain 
his primary aim. Since for Marx an activity is partly defined 
by its purpose, he expresses this by saying that the producer's 
activity has changed its character. Whereas before it was 
simply labour for subsistence now it has become 'labour-
for-an -income' : 
When the relation of exchange [Tausches] is pre-
supposed, labour immediately becomes labourjor-
an-income [ErwerbsarbeitJ27 ... Labour [that is, la-
bour before exchange - AC] was indeed the imme-
diate source of subsistence but at the same time the 
activation of his individual existence. Through ex-
change, his labour became in part a source of income. 
Its purpose and mode-of-existence have become 
different. [EPM 268, MEW 454] 
'Labour-for-an-income', then, is contradictory in that its 
objective character as species-activity is at odds with the 
subjective purpose of the person doing it. 28 
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Private property and domination 
by the object 
Just as the producer's activity now has a different character, 
so does the object he produces. Previously it was produced 
simply as an individual means of subsistence. It was not 
human property at all in Marx's sense. Now it is produced 
for other human beings, so it is human property. Yet from 
the point of view of the producer it is produced simply as a 
means of exchange. Previously the producer produced in 
isolation from other individuals - they did not appear on the 
scene at all. Now he produces for them, but since he 
produces his product as a means of exchange he must also 
produce it as something actively withheld from them. If my 
exchange is conditional I must withhold my product from 
you until you agree to give me yours in return, and you have 
to do likewise. Marx expresses this by saying that the object 
is now produced as 'private property'. It is private property 
in that it is human property which is at the same time 
privatus, excluded from the use of the other. 29 Thus private 
property as object is the counterpart oflabour -for -an-income 
as activity (along with its ancillary activity, the activity of 
exchanging). It has the same contradictory or estranged 
character as that activity: 
Exchange or barter is the social species-act, the 
community, social intercourse and integration of 
man within private property, and for that reason it is 
the external, alienated species-act. It appears as harter 
just because of this. (NJM 267, MEW 453) 
Furthermore, when the product is produced and exchanged 
as private property, the conditionality inherent in exchange 
gives it, in a certain sense, a power over its-own producer. 
This is because by A's making his act of giving B his 
product conditional on B' s doing the same, A uses his 
product as a means to gain control over B' s activity. On the 
other hand B is doing just the same thing to A. This means 
in turn that A's attitude is not whimsical or malicious: it is 
only by both offering to give B his product and threatening 
to withhold it, that A can get B 's product from him. Unless 
A has something which B needs to offer in exchange for B 's 
product, A's need does not constitute an 'effective demand' 
for that product, as economists have put it since Adam 
Smith. So A must use his product as a means by which to 
exert power over B, thanks to its capacity to satisfy B's 
needs. B is in the same position with respect to A. 
The thing that gives your need for my possessions a 
value, a worth, and an effect in my eyes is simply and 
solely your possession, the equivalent of my pos-
session. Our reciprocal product, therefore, is the 
means, the mediator, the instrument, the acknowl-
edged power of our mutual needs over each other. 
(EPM 276, MEW 461) 
Since each party uses his own product as a means of exerting 
power over the other, each is in turn reduced to a means for 
the other to produce what he needs. Each is forced by the 
other to produce his own product, in the sense that unless he 
does so he cannot satisfy his own need for the other's 
product. The instrumentality inherent in conditional ex-
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change makes instruments of the exchangers as well as of 
their products. The last stage in this argument is that, 
because I use my product as a power over you, forcing you 
to produce your own product, your own product in turn 
becomes a power over you. That is, you find yourself in a 
position where, in order to satisfy your need for my prod-
ucts, you must produce your own product. 
In your eyes your product is an instrument, a means 
whereby to master my product and hence to satisfy 
your needs. But in my eyes it is the purpose of our 
exchange. It is you who serve as the means, the 
instrument, in the production of this object which is 
my goal, just as conversely you stand in the same 
relation to my object. But (1) each of us really does 
behave in the way the other regards him. You have 
really turned yourself into the means, the instrument, 
the producer of your own object so as to master mine. 
(2) Your own object is merely the sensuous husk, the 
hidden form of my object. For its production signi-
fies, seeks to express, the acquisition [Erwerb] of my 
object. Thus you have really become a means, an 
instrument of your object even for yourself ... (JM 
277, MEW 462) 
or, in summary form: 
The means is the true power over an object and hence 
we each regard our own products as the power each 
has over the other and over himself, i.e. our own 
product has stood up on its hind legs against us: it had 
seemed to be our property, but in reality we are its 
property. (NJM 276, MEW 461) 
This domination by the object becomes much more ines-
capable once we have not just two people exchanging but a 
complete social division of labour based on conditional 
exchange. Then each individual only produces one thing 
and has to satisfy all his needs by exchanging that product: 
The more production becomes many-sided, i.e. the 
more needs become many-sided, the more the activity 
of the producer becomes one-sided, the more com-
pletely labour falls into the category of labour-for-
an-income until, finally, no other meaning is left to it. 
(NJM 268-9, MEW 454) 
So another way of putting this domination of the producer 
by his object would be to say that he is dominated by his 
position in the social division of labour. This is how Marx 
and Engels put it in the German Ideology (CW5 47, MEW2 
34). 
The social constitution of domination 
by the object 
It might be argued against Marx that the exchangers are only 
'compelled by their product' in the sense in which a human 
being is when he is in the 'savage state' producing entirely 
for his own (animal) needs. After all he too is in a situation 
where he can only satisfy his needs by producing his 
products. So he too finds his needs compelling him through 
the intermediary of the product, in the sense that he must 
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produce the product ifhe is to satisfy them. Why should the 
fact that the' conditional chain', that begins with his needs 
and ends with his compulsion to produce, passes via the 
product and the need of the other person make things dif-
ferent? 
Marx's answer might have been that the satisfaction of 
a being's intrinsic needs does not constitute a compulsion 
on that being. On the contrary, it is that being's essential 
activity. To say that beavers are 'compelled' to build dams 
by their need for fish supposes that there is something else 
they would rather be doing, that they have some other inner 
urges which are more essential to their nature than dam-
building. The separation between means and ends which 
makes it possible for the means to appear as compelled by 
the ends simply does not exist for the animal, or for man 'in 
the savage state' , producing for himself. In q,rder for means 
to separate out from, and stand in opposition to, ends, the 
two have to be incarnated in objects which I take different 
attitudes, and it is just this separation which conditional 
exchange achieves. 
If I produce something for my own needs, there is no 
clear line between production and consumption. Suppose I 
am living directly off the fruits of nature and I have to peel 
a fruit before eating it, does the peeling constitute an act of 
production of 'peeled fruit' or is it part of the consumption 
of the fruit? Is gathering fruit, or hunting for game, a 
separate act of production or an initial phase of consump-
tion? On the other hand, when I satisfy my needs indirectly 
through conditional exchange with others, production and 
consumption are clearly defined by their different objects. 
Production is what I do to the object I am going to exchange, 
consumption is what I do to the object I get in return. 
Conditional exchange also makes my productive activity 
'instrumental' in a quite new way, for the object which I 
produce no longer has any inherent connection with my 
needs. It is connected to them only insofar as others are 
willing to give me something in exchange for it which will 
satisfy my needs, thus only via the wills of other people. 
With the development of exchange: 
It becomes wholly contingent and inessential whether 
the relationship between producer and product is one 
of immediate enjoyment and personal needs, and 
whether the activity, the act of working, involves the 
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fulfilment of his personality, the realisation of his 
natural talents and spiritual goals. (NJM 269, MEW 
454) 
So my production of my product becomes completely 
separate from my satisfaction of my need. 
When in addition the means to the satisfaction of a need 
is in the possession of another consciousness who is de-
liberately using it to force me to act in accord with his will 
rather than mine, then I can come to experience producing 
my own product in order to gain that means as a 'compul-
sion' .30 
To put it another way, it is only because the other person 
uses my activity as an instrumental way to produce the 
object which he needs, that I come to use my own activity 
in an instrumental way too. As Marx says, 'each of us really 
does behave as the other regards him.' 
So the compulsion with respect to his own object which 
each party experiences in the exchange relationship is not 
simply the consequence of a compulsive quality of his own 
needs which is transmitted through a chain of necessary 
conditions for the satisfaction of those needs, achain ending 
with his production of the object. Rather, the compulsion is 
constituted in the relationship of conditional exchange 
itself. The inherent externality of a conditional exchange 
relationship is reproduced in an 'externality' in the way in 
which each exchanger relates to his own product, and to his 
own activity. 
Egoistic need as alienated need 
This self-external quality of productive activity is what 
Marx refers to when he calls productive activity within the 
relations of private property' estranged' or 'alienated' labour. 
As Marx describes it: 
... to the labourer the maintenance of his individual 
existence appears as the aim of his activity; his actual 
doings count only as a means to this end. He thus 
activates his life to acquire the means of life. (NJM 
269, MEW 454) 
Rather than say more on alienated labour, though I want to 
concentrate on what conditional exchange means for the 
way in which human need comes into existence for Marx. 
One way he puts this is that human needs come into 
existence as egoistic or self-interested need. This is need 
which is actively counterposedto the needs of others. While 
animal need is not even conscious of the needs of others and 
properly human need is the need to satisfy the needs of 
others, here the individual is conscious of the needs of 
others, but only as something alien to his own. Egoistic need 
is the counterpart of alienated labour and private property. 
It is human need as it is experienced within an exchange 
economy, within 'civil society'. 
Egoistic need develops alongside the social division of 
labour mediated by conditional exchange, in other words 
alongside the increasing transformation of activity into 
labour-for-an-income. Labour-for-an-income means: 
the determination of the labourer by social needs 
which are alien to him and a compulsion on him, to 
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which he submits from egoistic need, from necessity 
[Not]; for him they mean only a source of satisfaction 
of his pressing-need [Notdwft] while for them he is 
only the slave that satisfies their needs .... Thus the 
greater, the more developed the power of society 
within the private property relation, the more man is 
egoistic, unsocial and estranged from his own essence. 
(NJM 269, MEW 454) 
The association of egoistic need with 'necessity' in the last 
quote connects egoistic need with the idea of compulsion by 
one's own object. The exchange relation results in each 
person experiencing the production of their own object as a 
kind of compulsion. His need for the object which he 
produces is a 'compulsive need'. It is a need which he 
himself experiences as impinging on him externally. We 
could describe such needs as 'estranged' or 'alienated' in 
the same way that Marx describes labour-for-an-income as 
estranged labour. 31 
Since my need for my own product is not based on my 
direct use of it but on my ability to exchange it for others, 
this compulsion also takes the form of needing to have the 
product, to hold it exclusively. The 'fundamental presup-
position of private property' is that man 'only produces in 
order to have' (NJM 274, MEW 459).32 Exclusive posses-
sion is the absolute prerequisite of conditional exchange. 
Once barter has developed into exchange mediated by 
money, my compulsive need for my product becomes 
subordinate to my compulsive need for the money for which 
I can sell it, so that Marx can say that 'The need for money 
is ... the true need created by the modern economic system, 
and the only need it creates' (EPM 358, MEW 547). 
When Marx extends his analysis from production for 
exchange to capitalism, he develops two forms of this need 
for money. Capitalism is essentially conceived as produc-
tion for exchange in which one section of society (the 
capitalists) come to personify money and its power, while 
the rest (the workers) personify labour-for-an-income or 
estranged labour. Correspondingly, egoistic need in the 
capitalist becomes the need to accumulate money as such, 
while in the worker it becomes reduced to the need for 
enough money just to maintain himself as a worker. Yet 
despite this asymmetry, both conceptions of need are sim-
ply developments of the basic idea of egoistic need as 
constituted in simple exchange: the need for your own 
object, made compulsive through your relation to another 
with whom you hope to exchange it. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, when Marx talks of 'worldly relations' being 
responsible for the fixing of our needs as an alien power 
over us, I suggest that it is the exchange relation that he has 
principally in mind. For Marx, human need is constituted in 
exchange society in a self-contradictory or estranged form, 
just as species-activity and its objects, human property, are. 
On the one hand, human need is the need for the products of 
other human beings; on the other it takes the form of a need 
counterposed to the needs of others. On the one hand it is 
need which through its universality expresses the freedom 
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intrinsic to species-activity; on the other it takes the form of 
a compulsive need which is opposed to freedom. On the one 
hand, it is the need for interchange with other human beings; 
on the other it takes the form of the need to possess an 
inanimate thing. 
By extension, Marx's positive conception of needs in 
'truly human society' or socialism does not amount to a list 
of what will or will not count as needs for human beings in 
such a society. It is simply the idea that in such a society 
needs will no longer have the contradictory form that they 
necessarily take in a society based on private property and 
conditional exchange - the kind of society in which alone 
they can be constituted and developed. 
Notes 
I I am grateful to Michael Inwood, Mike Martin, Danny Goldstick 
and the editors of Radical Philosophy for comments on an earlier 
version of this paper. I have used the following abbreviations: 
NJM = Notes on .lames Mill (in Early Writings, ed. Colletti), 
EPM = Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (in Early 
Writings,ed. Colletti), CW = Marxand Engels: Collected Works 
(with volume number), MEW = Marx-Engels Werke (with 
volume number; if no number is given, the Erganzesband). I 
have modified the translations cited on a number of occasions. 
All emphases in quotes are Marx's. 
2 I have in mind, for example, the writings of Erich Fromm and 
Herbert Marcuse. 
3 See, for example, Heller 1974, pp. 31-3. 
4 For example, Geras 1983, pp. 104-6. 
5 See especially pp. 255-7. 
6 Marx's term Bediilfnis is generally translated as a 'need' in 
English editions of his works, occasionally as a 'want' or a 
'requirement'. There is only one other term which he uses which 
is sometimes translated as 'need'. This is Not (meaning neces-
sity, exigency, distress). Marx only uses this very occasionally. 
What I want to look at here is Marx's use of Bediilfnis and of the 
terms closely related to it (hediilfen, hediilftig, Bedibftigkeit). 
When I talk about' Marx' s concept of need' I mean strictly the 
concept that Marx expressed by Bedibfnis and these related terms. 
I translate Marx 's Mensch and menschlich in the traditional way 
as 'man' and 'human', and use the pronouns 'he' and 'his' with 
them. Although the German Mensch is more gender-neutral, this 
translation seems to reflect Marx' s intentions more closely than 
adopting deliberately gender-neutral formulations. 
7 McLellan 1969, pp. 107-11, points out that Feuerbach is prob-
ably the source of Marx' s idea that the essence of a thing is given 
by its objects. For example in Principles of the Philosophy of the 
Future (1834) Feuerbach says that: 'What a being [Wesen] is, 
however, is recognised, only through its object; the object to 
which a being nect:ssarily relates is nothing but its own revealed 
essence [Wesen]' (7, Vogel p. 9, Schmidt p. 40). Cf. Hegel's 
definition of essence as 'relation to itself only by being relation 
to another' (Enc.vc/opaedia Logic § 112, Garaets et aI., p. 175, 
Suhrkamp, vol. 8, p. 112). Marx's difference here is that he 
relates man's essence specifically to the objects of his needs. 
8 I shall refer to the first two texts collectively as the 1844 
Manuscripts. 
9 In his 1843 Critique of Hegel' s Philosophy of Right Marx oc-
casionally contrasted Gattung with Art as genus to species (e.g. 
Early Writings 88, MEW 1 231), but he does not seem to intend 
such a contrast in the 1844 writings. 
10 Sich zu sich selhst verhalt: an alternative translation would be 
'treats himself' or 'behaves towards himself'. 
11 Here I only follow Marx, who says elsewhere that the whole 
character of a species 'is contained in the character of its life-
activity' (EPM 328, MEW 516). 
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Thus the term 'species-activity' does not mean the activity 
characteristic of any species, but specifically the activity char-
acteristic ofthe human species, of that species whose character-
istic activity incorporates the species in its intentional content; 
of that species which is a species 'for itself'. 
Del' Austausch. Marx evidently does not mean to limit this to the 
conditional exchange of private property, introduced below. 
Cf. EPM 328, MEW 516: 'free conscious activity is the species-
character of man. ' 
Hegel in the Philosophy of Right suggests that when I use a thing 
to satisfy a need I cease to recognise its particularity and relate 
to it in a universal way. 'The thing is reduced to a means of 
satisfying my need' (§59A), and so to an instance of the class of 
things which could satisfy that need. There seems to be a 
difficulty here: if a bird eats a worm (rather than a stick), does it 
treat the worm as food and so 'make the kind its object'? Perhaps 
Marx would have said that to treat it as food in the sense intended 
here it must have a concept of food, and so must be conscious. 
Thus I shall claim that Marx does not use 'needs' in the way 
standard in modem English, to mean requirements for survival 
or for well-being, although of course human needs in Marx's 
sense are generally also, as a matter of fact, such requirements. 
Marx's term comes from the language of psychology and 
political economy, as, for example, taken up by Hegel into the 
Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Spirit, §431-5, 471-3 and the 
Philosophy of Right § 189-95, rather than from the language of 
moral argument. 
Cf. Hegel's descriptions of the tool in the System of Ethical Life 
as the' persistent rule of labour' (Harris and Knox p. 113, Lasson 
p. 428) and as a 'corporeal sign' (Harris and Knox p. 115, Lasson 
p.431). 
Cf. EPM 352, MEW 541: 'when objective actuality becomes 
everywhere for man in society the actuality of man's essential 
powers ... all ohjects become for him the ohjectification of 
himself, become objects which confirm and actualise his indi-
viduality, become his objects.' 
Regrettably the Early Writings translation omit5 the 'crucial phrase 
'inner property' (cf. CW3 218). The contrast between inner and 
outer property is also cast between 'true property' and exclusory 
property (NJM 276, MEW 461), or else between 'truly human 
and social property' and private property (EPM 333, MEW 521), 
or between 'the meaning of private property' and the estranged 
form in which it exists (EPM 375, MEW 563; cf. the reference 
to the 'essence of private property' at EPM 261, MEW 446). 
Marx's conception of inner property as the objectification of 
species-activity derives from Hegel's theory of property as the 
objectification of the free will in the Philosophy of Right (e.g. 
§41). The contrast between outer and inner property is a de-
scendant of Hegel's opposition between possession ('external 
power over something') and property (' that I, as free will, am an 
object to myself in what I possess and only become an actual will 
by this means', §45). While possession is particular, property is 
rational and so implicitly universal (§49). However, while Hegel 
generally associates the satisfaction of needs with possession 
and particularity (§41A, 45, 49, 59), Marx, in a Feuerbachian 
inversion, identifies needs with his 'true' property. Elsewhere I 
hope to show that the contrast between inner and outer property 
is the seed of Marx' s later opposition between productive forces ~ 
and relations of production. 
In the 1857 introduction Marx does not seem to go further than 
this, asserting that, although products and needs presuppose 
each other, 'production is the real point of departure and hence 
also the predominant moment' (Grundrisse, p. 94). 
The implication is that art -objects are the most developed 
example of 'universal objects'. Marx seems to be drawing on 
Kant's aesthetics, in which beauty consists in the formal (hence 
universal) qualities of an object, and in which the appreciation 
of such objects does not mean their individual consumption, so 
that they are available for others too. 
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This is the same idea as he later expresses in the Critique of the 
Gotha Programme by saying that in the higher phase of commu-
nism labour becomes 'life's prime need' (Selected Works, Vol. 
3, p. 19, MEW19 21). 
Geras (1983, p. 62) sees Marx as operating with a 'physiologi-
cally given' concept of human nature here, but the passage is also 
consistent with the view I have derived from the 1844 writings, 
in which the human essence appears in the progressive univer-
salisation and social mediation of needs which may be initially 
simply physiologically based urges. 
This last passage was admittedly crossed out in the text. 
Marx implicitly contrasts Tausch (exchange) and Tauschhandel 
(barter) to wechselseitiger Austausch (mutual interchange) in 
NlM 269, MEW 455. But his usage is not entirely stable, since 
on NlM 266, MEW 451 and again on NlM 274, MEW 459 he 
usesAustausch where he evidently means conditional exchange. 
It might be said that any kind of interchange of products must be 
conditional in some sense. Marx's response might have been 
that when my production for others becomes in itself a need for 
me, then it becomes conditional on others producing for me only 
in the minimal sense that unless they do I will not survive, or at 
least not as a person motivated by such a need. As long as I 
remain such a person, however, I will be motivated to produce 
for others without 'making conditions', in the way that a com-
poser who 'lives for work' does. 
If this is a historical transition it suggests an original state of 
nature in which human beings produce for themselves in isola-
tion from each other. This would contradict Marx' s usual view 
that 'the more deeply we go back into history, the more does the 
individual, and hence also the producing individual, appear as 
dependent, as belonging to a greater whole' (Grundrisse, p. 84). 
In his later works Marx thinks of conditional exchange as 
starting on the borders of such early societies. 
Alternative translations might be 'labour-for-a-living' or 'la-
bour-for-gain'. In this passage Marx immediately qualifies 
labour-for-an-income as 'estranged' (entfremdete). As I shall 
suggest below, it becomes the estranged or 'alienated' 
(entausserte) labour of the Economic and Philosophical Manu-
scripts. The distinction between labour and labour-for-an-in-
come foreshadows that between concrete labour and abstract 
labour in Marx' s mature works. It corresponds to that between 
'labour' and 'industry' in Sir lames Steuart, for whom industry 
is 'the application to ingenious labour in a free man, in order to 
procure, by means of trade, an equivalent' (Inquiry, p. 33, cf. p. 
37). Marx acknowledges Steuart's 'industry' as the sources for 
his own 'abstract labour' in the Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy, p. 58. 
Similarly in the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
Hegel says that a form of knowledge is contradictory in that its 
conception of its object is at odds with its conception of the 
subjective act of cognition of the object (Phenomenology of Spirit, 
pp. 52-4). 
See the analysis of the contrast between human and private 
property in note 19 above. 
Subsequently individuals might transfer the same sense of 
compulsion to those areas of life in which they continue to 
produce for themselves (cooking for example). My reconstruc-
tion of Marx here is obviously inspired by Hegel's dialectic of 
mastery and servitude (Herrschaft und Knechtschaft) , in which 
the servant's relationship to the object he produces is trans-
formed by his relationship of subordination to the master 
(Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 117-19). On my reading, Marx 
represents the relationship between conditional exchangers in 
the Notes on lames Mill as a kind of mutual master and servant 
relationship, in which each threatens the other (though not with 
violent death, as in Hegel, but with refusal to satisfy a need). 
Marx himself concludes his account of domination by the object 
with an apparent reference to Hegel's master-servant relation: 
'If our mutual servitude (Knechtschaft) to the object appears at 
the beginning of the development in actuality as the relation of 
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mastery and slavery [Herrschaft und Sklaverei], that is only the 
crude and frank expression of our essential relationship' (NlM 
277, MEW 462). 
31 I owe the formulation' alienated needs' to Helier 1974, ch. 2. 
32 Cf. EPM 352, MEW 540: 'all the physical and intellectual 
senses have been replaced by the simple estrangement of all 
these senses - the sense of ha vi ng. ' 
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